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Reform of the European Electoral Law 
by Friedrich Pukelsheim und Kai-Friederike Oelbermann 
On 4 December 2014 the Committee on Constitutional Affairs of the European 
Parliament conducted a public hearing on the reform of the European Election Act, 
actually its first hearing during the legislative period 2014–2019. Among the experts 
invited were the present authors, who report on the meeting. For the translation of votes 
into seats they propose a double-proportional procedure securing electoral equality with 
regard to the political preferences of all voters in the Union as well as guaranteeing each 
member state its preordained seat contingent. Double-proportionality becomes feasible, 
however, only when the European party system reaches a level allowing the aggregation 
of all votes across the whole Union. 
Die erste öffentliche Anhörung der Legislaturperiode 2014–2019, die der Ausschuss für 
konstitutionelle Fragen des Europäischen Parlaments durchführte, fand am 
4. Dezember 2014 statt und galt der Reform des Europäischen Wahlakts. Die Autoren, die
zu den eingeladenen Sachverständigen zählen, berichten von der Sitzung. In ihrer Stel-
lungnahme skizzieren sie für die Sitzzuteilung ein doppeltproportionales Verfahren, das 
hinsichtlich aller Wählerstimmen die politischen Präferenzen nach dem Grundsatz der 
Wahlgleichheit abbildet und hinsichtlich der Mitgliedstaaten die vorab bestimmten Sitz-
kontingente garantiert. Der Doppelproporz kann allerdings erst umgesetzt werden, wenn 
das europäische Parteiensystem so weit entwickelt ist, dass es der unionsweiten Aggrega-
tion aller Wählerstimmen einen Rahmen gibt.  
I. AFCO Committee’s Public Hearing on 4 December 2014
The Committee on Constitutional Affairs is a standing committee of the Europe-
an Parliament. Parliamentary jargon calls it AFCO Committee, AFCO being an 
acronym derived from the French affaires constitutionnelles.1 Besides a Novem-
ber workshop on Challenges in Constitutional Affairs in the New Term, the pub-
lic hearing on the Reform of the European Electoral Law on 4 December 2014 in 
Brussels was the first formal hearing organized by the AFCO Committee in the 
legislative period 2014–2019, thus testifying to the topic’s prominence. AFCO 
chairwoman Danuta Hübner (EPP-PL) suggested structuring the analysis of 




• Practical arrangements not requiring changes to the law in order to
strengthen the visibility of the European elections and the public aware-
ness thereof;
• Changes to secondary law: Right to vote and stand as a candidate in
elections to the European Parliament for citizens of the Union residing
in a member state of which they are not nationals (Regulation
93/109/EC as amended);
• Measures implementing the Election Act proposed by the European Par-
liament and adopted by the Council after consulting the Commission
(Article 14 Election Act);
• Changes to the Election Act in order for example to establish a level
playing field for parties and candidates;
• Changes to the Treaties for example to modify the number of Members
of Parliament with a view to introduce transnational lists.
The rules of the European Parliament limit the number of speakers a committee 
may invite to a hearing to four. The AFCO Committee invited Yves Bertoncini
(Notre Europe – Institut Jacques Delors, Paris), Roberto D’Alimonte (Libera 
Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli, Rome), Brendan 
O’Leary (University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia), and the first of the present 
authors who teamed up with the second. An additional distinguished speaker was 
Andrew Duff (Cambridge), Member of the European Parliament 1999–2014 and 
AFCO rapporteur on electoral procedure in former legislative periods.
Expert hearings in the German Bundestag and the European Parliament differ 
significantly in their function. In the Bundestag, a hearing constitutes the final 
action of a decision-making process. Typically a committee organizes a hearing 
just before the topic is concluded and handed over to the plenum, only after each 
political group has determined their stance and made their proposals public. 
Experts are expected not so much to contribute finding an optimum solution, but 
rather to endorse the committee’s ingenuity and to praise the existing proposals. 
Such expectations are rarely met. The event may entail a bit of frustration on all 
sides and, accordingly, attendance often leaves something to be desired. 
In the European Parliament, hearings are among the first actions in a commit-
tee’s decision-making process. The theme of electoral reform has a long history, 
of course, but for the sitting AFCO Committee the December hearing marked the 
start of its work on the subject. Interest and open-mindedness of those present 
was noticeable during the presentation of the experts’ statements as well as dur-
ing the ensuing discussion. For the most time the meeting room, seating 160, was 
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packed with committee members and their staff, besides a few public. Because of 
the early stage of the hearing and in the absence of definite commitments by the 
political groups, the opinions of the experts covered a rather broad range of rele-
vant aspects. 
In a nutshell, the experts emphasized the following points. Andrew Duff appealed 
to incumbent committee members: Do try to be more bold! The aim ought to be 
to call another convention, in order to install transnational lists and to adjust the 
balance of power between the Union’s institutions. Brendan O’Leary presented 
two visions. In his confederal vision he recommended the status of times past 
when members of the Common Assembly were delegated by the member states’ 
parliaments, thus furthering parliamentary collaboration at Union and domestic 
levels. In his federal vision he questioned the need for more uniformity in the 
Election Act, notwithstanding the establishment of a European Electoral Authori-
ty. Roberto D’Alimonte pointed out that a common electoral law is not absolutely 
essential as it would neither increase voter turnout nor the Parliament’s legitima-
cy. The significant differences in size of member states is a reality and cannot be 
overcome by legal provisions, though double-proportionality might be worth 
considering. Yves Bertoncini pointed out that electoral systems go hand in hand 
with parliamentary practice. Placing more emphasis on political parties would 
make sense only when the Parliament would divide into a government majority 
versus an opposition minority. Currently the European Parliament rather resem-
bles the scheme of a great coalition, in that it usually aims at carrying decisions 
by the broadest possible consensus. Our own statement, of which the essentials 
are reproduced in Part II, was entitled Reinforcing Uniformity in the European 
Election Act: Gentle Interim Arrangements in 2019 towards Systematic Double-
Proportionality in 2024. We proposed a double-proportional method for the 
translation of votes into seats first presented in this journal.2
It remains to be seen which actions the AFCO Committee will take on the 
grounds of this hearing and its forthcoming deliberations.
2 Oelbermann, K.-F./Pukelsheim, F.: Future European Parliament Elections. Ten Steps Towards Uniform 
Procedures, in: ZSE, 9 (2011), 9–28. See also Chapter 14 in Pukelsheim, F.: Proportional Representa-




II. Reinforcing Uniformity in the Election Act
Section 1 argues that the fatal defect of current European Parliament elections, 
the misdirection of the electorate, will only be overcome provided unionwide 
political parties emerge to contest the election and to carry the electoral cam-
paign. Sections 2 and 3 assume that such a European party system comes into 
being. Section 2 describes a double-proportional method for the translation of 
votes into seats that fits the Union’s constitutional frame perfectly. Double-
proportionality is illustrated by means of the 2009 election results, in tables 1 and 
2. Due to the lack of unionwide parties in 2009, the illustrations necessitate some
practically unrealistic alignments. Section 3 proposes three interim arrangements 
for 2019 that might pave the way to introduce systematic double-proportionality 
in 2024.
1. What is the Problem? Misdirection of the Electorate
The biggest defect of the current electoral system3 is that it misdirects the elec-
torate. The election campaign focuses on political leaders who shape the political 
scene of a member state, but who are known not to compete for a seat in the 
European Parliament. Voters are handed ballot sheets listing political parties that 
are part of the domestic sphere of a member state, but that are virtually invisible 
in the political work of the European Parliament. The 186 domestic parties4 that 
are presented to the Union’s electorate eventually boil down to a handful of po-
litical groups that shape Parliament’s daily routine, but that are not presented to 
the electorate. To quote but one source from the literature: There is a “mismatch”
between the institutional role the European Parliament is asked to play in the 
European Union’s separation of powers – the voice of European citizens about 
European Union politics – and the level of party competition at which European 
Parliament elections are contested.5 Therefore, if the European Parliament de-
3 The elections are governed by the 1976 Election Act, as amended in 2002. A consolidated version of the 
Election Act is included as Annex II in: Report (A7-0176/2011, 28.07.2011) on a proposal for a modifi-
cation of the Act concerning the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal 
suffrage of 20.09.1976 (2009/2134(INI)), Rapporteur: Andrew Duff, European Parliament 2009–2014, 
RR\865675EN.doc, PE440.210v04-00.
4 Hrbek, R.: Europawahl 2014. Kontinuität und neue Facetten, in: Integration, 37 (2014), 205–227, here 
217.
5 Schleicher, D.: What If Europe Held an Election and No One Cared?, in: Harvard International Law 
Journal, 52 (2011), 109–161, here 110. Schleicher corroborates his “mismatch thesis” in detail and at 
length with many persuasive arguments. As a remedy he proposes a re-design of ballot sheets and the 
introduction of unionwide thresholds; these proposals are followed up in our Section 3.
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sires to inject more uniformity into its Election Act, then an indispensable neces-
sary prerequisite is the establishment of unionwide parties to play a proper role 
in elections, or so it would seem to us. There is an abundance of literature on the 
subject, by political scientists, by constitutional lawyers, and by practicing politi-
cians.6 Being mathematicians it is beyond our competence to comment upon how 
to create a unionwide party system. Instead we assume that unionwide political 
parties will come into existence and will be ready to contest elections. Under this 
assumption we propose a scheme of translating votes into seats that fits the Un-
ion’s constitutional frame perfectly, double-proportionality. 
Before continuing we briefly digress and specify the term unionwide party, for 
our purposes. We give it a less restrictive meaning than the term political parties 
at European level that appears in the regulation regarding party funding.7 Our 
notion of a unionwide party is to indicate a political organization that observes, 
in particular in its programme and in its activities, the principles on which the 
European Union is founded and that has participated or intends to participate in 
elections to the European Parliament. This is all we require. In most cases a 
unionwide party will be active in two or more member states, at best in all of 
them. However, the definition admits a unionwide party to be present in just a 
single member state. The reason is that the system should also accommodate 
newly emerging parties which cannot but start small.
2. What is the Solution? Double-Proportionality, starting 2024
Double-proportionality apportions parliamentary seats with regard to two dimen-
sions, how the electorate is divided by political parties and how it is partitioned 
into territorial districts. What does double-proportionality look like when applied 
to the European Parliament? The political dimension captures the performance of 
the unionwide parties, of course. The territorial dimension consists of the alloca-
tion of Parliament’s seats between the member states of the Union. In the jargon 
of the Union’s primary law this is referred to as the composition of the European 
6 We quote but three: Hix, S.: What’s Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It, New York, 2008; 
Huber, P.M.: Demokratische Legitimation in der Europäischen Union, in: ZSE, 7 (2009), 364–380; Priest-
ley, J.: European Political Parties. The Missing Link, Notre Europe Policy Paper 41, Paris, 2010.
7 Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 04.11.2003 on the 
regulations governing political parties at the European level and the rules regarding their funding. Offi-
cial Journal of the European Union, L 297 (15.11.2003), 1–4. See also Leinen, J./Pescher, F.: Von Par-
teibündnissen zu echten Parteien auf europäischer Ebene? Hintergrund, Gegenstand und Folgen der neu-
en Regeln für Europäische Parteien, in: Integration, 37 (2014), 228–246. 
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Parliament.8 Double-proportionality is manageable no matter how the composi-
tion is brought about, whether it emerges from a negotiated political fix as in the 
past, or whether it is obtained by a durable and transparent formula. Double-
proportionality requires some set of seat contingents for the member states to be 
preordained, but any set will do.
Double-proportional apportionment methods proceed in two steps, called super-
apportionment and sub-apportionment. The super-apportionment reflects the 
political dimension of the division of the electorate: all disposable seats are ap-
portioned in proportion to the vote totals of the unionwide parties. A sample 
super-apportionment is shown in table 1, re-evaluating the 2009 elections in a 
double-proportional manner.9 Since unionwide parties did not exist in 2009, we 
replace them by the political groups that were formed at the beginning of the 
legislative period. The vote total of a political group is taken to be the aggrega-
tion of the votes cast for the domestic parties that joined this group. The non-
attached members are assembled in a pseudo-group NA. Thus table 1 encom-
passes all 144.244.444 votes that effectively entered into the 2009 seat allocation 
calculations.
Table 1: Sample 2009 double-proportional seat apportionment: Super-apportionment
of 751 seats among eight political groups
Calculations are based on the unionwide votes for the 2009 political groups, in lieu of the non-
existing votes for unionwide parties. Normally the group of non-attached seats (NA) would require a 
8 Article 14(2) EU Treaty, see: Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union. Official Journal 
of the European Union, C 83 (30.03.2010), 13–45. 
9 This is Table 14.5 in Pukelsheim, F.: Proportional Representation, op.cit. For the unionwide aggregation 
of the political groups’ vote counts see also Oelbermann, K.-F./Pukelsheim, F.: Future European Par-
liament Elections, op.cit.
Friedrich Pukelsheim/Kai-Friederike Oelbermann Reform of the European Electoral Law
ZSE 4/2014 555
separate handling. Sample calculation: The EPP votes (52.324.413) are divided by the union divisor 
(192.200). The quotient 272.2 justifies 272 seats.
Table 2: Sample 2009 double-proportional seat apportionment: Sub-apportionment
by political groups and member states.
Seats are allocated to the political groups in the member states using the double-proportional divisor 
method with standard rounding. The divisors guarantee each member state its preordained seat con-
tingent, and each political group its party-seats from the super-apportionment. Sample calculation: 
The German EPP votes (9.968.153) are divided by the DE divisor (251.000), and by the EPP divisor 
(0.9575). The quotient 41.48 (not shown) justifies 41 seats.
The super-apportionment in table 1 handles all unionwide votes simultaneously 
and treats them equally, with no regard to member state provenance. Every 
192.200 votes justify roughly one seat. The prime benefit of the unionwide seat
apportionment is that it secures electoral equality among all Union citizens when 
votes are taken to express political preferences.10 At present, electoral equality is 
10 An added benefit is the facilitation for a state to subdivide its area into electoral districts, compare
McLean, I.: Don’t Let the Lawyers Do the Math: Some Problems of Legislative Districting in the UK 
and the USA, in: Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 38 (2008), 1446–1454.
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strangely absent in the Union’s primary law.11 However, the Treaties are full of 
promises to observe equality among Union citizens, all member states subscribe 
to electoral equality being one of the five principles underlying Europe’s elec-
toral heritage,12 and the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to which the Union shall accede13 values 
electoral equality highly. We propose that the Union grants its citizens a free, 
equal, and secret ballot. This is our only plea for a change to the Treaties.
The double-proportional seat apportionment concludes with the sub-
apportionment of seats by unionwide parties and member states. This second step 
is more laborious since it must verify two conditions: the party-seats from the 
super-apportionment must be met, as must be the preordained seat contingents of 
the member states. table 2 shows the sample re-evaluation of the 2009 elections. 
The party names and their overall seats are copied from the super-apportionment 
into the table’s top row, the left column exhibits member states and their seat 
contingents.14 The seats of a state’s party are obtained via double division and 
rounding: The pertinent vote count is divided by the associated state divisor and 
by the associated party divisor, and then the resulting quotient is rounded to the 
nearest whole number. It may be checked that the seat numbers thus obtained 
sum columnwise to the party’s overall seats and rowwise to the State’s seat con-
tingent, as desired. In summary, double-proportionality appears to suit the Un-
ion’s needs perfectly. The task is to find ways and means to get there.
While the main obstacle remains the creation of a system of unionwide parties, 
other issues also require attention when ballots are aggregated across the whole 
Union: the varied ballot structures that are entertained by the 28 member states.
Most of the required harmonization can be achieved at low cost. However, ballot 
sheets from single transferable vote systems constitute a problem. These systems 
put a particular emphasis on the personalization aspects of an election, as op-
11 On the other hand Di Fabio, U.: Entwicklungsperspektiven für das Europäische Parlament, in: ZSE, 12 
(2014) 9–17, here 12, finds that the principle of electoral equality “need not hold, in fact strictly speaking 
must not hold, without shifting the character of a compound of states adversely to its conception towards a 
federal state” (our translation). Article 14(3) EU Treaty reads: “The members of the European Parliament 
shall be elected for a term of five years by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot.”
12 Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission): Code of 
Good Practice in Electoral Matters – Guidelines and Explanatory Report, Opinion no. 190/2002, CDL-
AD (2002) 23 rev. Strasbourg, 23.05.2003. 
13 Article 6(2) EU Treaty.
14 These contingents total 751 seats and result from the Cambridge Compromise, see Section 14.9 in 
Pukelsheim, F.: Proportional Representation, op.cit. They differ from the actual 2009 seat contingents. 
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posed to focusing on political parties. A common denominator with the propor-
tional representation systems used by other member states might be the introduc-
tion of open lists (where not in use already).15 The issue needs careful considera-
tion, but we do not pursue it here further. Moreover any re-design of ballot sheets 
should foster e-voting which will become indispensable in future elections in 
view of the ever increasing mobility of society.
3. How to Get There? Three Interim Arrangements for 2019
The establishment of unionwide parties that competently and attractively contest 
European Parliament elections may need more time than provided by a legisla-
tive period of five years. Ten years should suffice though. Therefore we suggest 
decreeing double proportionality now, to start in 2024. The European Parliament 
would join the company of many other parliaments that are used to pass signifi-
cant electoral amendments with the proviso that these take effect, not in the cur-
rent legislative period, but in the next.
For the next election in 2019 we propose three interim arrangements that will 
encourage the formation of unionwide parties. The three proposals could be 
incorporated into the Election Act. The first two, a Europeanized ballot design 
(a) and the introduction of unionwide thresholds (b), would continue to apply in 
the long run. The third item, transnational lists (c), is a transitional measure for 
2019 only, because it becomes redundant once double-proportionality is adopted.
a) Ballot Design
The first proposal is that ballot sheets must exhibit the emblem and name of the 
unionwide party to which a domestic party is affiliated ahead of the emblem and 
name of the domestic party itself. Presumably the existing political parties at 
European level serve as germs from which unionwide parties will grow. Hence 
many domestic parties know already now to which unionwide party they will 
become affiliated, and could comply with the proposal quite readily. Non-
affiliated parties will have a ballot box preceded by white space and thus expose 
their missing European outlook. In this way information on the ballot sheets will 
no longer be restricted to the domestic sphere. During the election campaign 
parties will advertise their ballot boxes to inform their supporters. The new de-
15 Hix, S./Hagemann, S.: Could Changing the Electoral Rules Fix European Parliament Elections?, in:
Politique européenne, 28 (2009), 27–41. 
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sign will spread and induce voters to sense a European perspective. Altogether it 
will be easier than now for voters to develop a clear and consistent opinion of 
their European options.
b) Threshold Cascade
The second proposal intends to award domestic parties for their efforts to acquire 
the status of a unionwide party and to expand into several member states. The 
idea is to lower the maximum 5% threshold of article 3 of the Election Act de-
pending on how a party’s support spreads across the Union. By way of example 
the threshold cascade may take the following form: Throughout the Union valid 
votes for a party become effective (that is, enter into the seat apportionment 
calculations) only when the party attracts at least
• 5% of the valid votes in one member state;
• or 4% of the valid votes in each of two member states;
• or 3% of the valid votes in each of four member states;
• or 2% of the valid votes in each of eight member states.
The threshold cascade does not apply to votes for independent candidates; effec-
tiveness of these votes could be left to be settled in domestic provisions.
c) Transnational Lists
The third proposal offers unionwide parties a concrete reward to strive for, 
namely seats contested at Union level rather than contested within the member 
States’ domains. Transnational lists, having been present in the discussion for 
quite some time, figure prominently in this Committee’s 2011 report.16 We elab-
orate on the idea with the understanding that it will become outdated as soon as 
double-proportionality takes over for good. In view of the transitional nature of 
the measure its one-time implementation in 2019 ought to leave the Treaties 
alone and comply with current primary law. We sketch an approach how this 
could be achieved.
16 Item 2 on page 7 of the Report reads: “[The European Parliament] proposes that an additional 25 MEPs 
be elected by a single constituency formed of the whole territory of the European Union; transnational 
lists would be composed of candidates drawn from at least one third of the States, and may ensure an 
adequate gender representation; each elector would be enabled to cast one vote for the EU-wide list in 
addition to their vote for the national or regional list; voting for the EU constituency would be in ac-
cordance with the closed list proportional system […].”
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Our approach is contingent on the composition of the European Parliament being 
derived from a durable and transparent formula as afforded by the Cambridge 
Compromise or one of its variants.17 When compared to the sitting Parliament’s 
composition it transpires that about 25 or 26 seats need to be re-allocated.18 Most 
of these seats are transferred from middle-sized member states to bigger states. 
We propose that these seats are not handed out to the target states. Instead, they 
are set aside to be apportioned via transnational lists, as outlined in the 2011 
report.
At first glance the proposal seems to put an undue burden on the (mostly bigger) 
member states that would profit from the transfer. On second thoughts the bur-
den may well be softened by the outcome of the transnational seat apportion-
ment. For when composing their transnational lists, unionwide parties will have 
to reach out for their prospective voters. Three quarters of the Union’s citizens 
live in the seven biggest member states. Transnational lists cannot but feature 
plenty of nominees from the big member states, perhaps not three quarters of all 
candidates, but certainly not much less than half of them. In essence, most of the 
transnational list seats will eventually be filled with nominees from the bigger 
member states.19 This looming imbalance makes us doubt whether transnational 
lists, while promising to be an expedient measure in 2019, would stand the test 
of time in the long run. They certainly cannot compete with the perfect solution 
offered by double-proportionality.
17 Grimmett, G.R. et.al.: The allocation between the EU Member States of the seats in the European 
Parliament, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: 
Citizen’s Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Note 23.03.2011 (PE 432.760). See also Section 12.9 in 
Pukelsheim, F.: Proportional Representation, op.cit.
18 The limited-loss variant of the Cambridge Compromise affects 25 seats with 2013 QMV-populations, 
and 26 seats with 2014 population figures. See Table 12.5 in Pukelsheim, F.: Proportional Representa-
tion, op.cit., and Annex One in Duff’s contribution to the hearing.
19 To evade this imbalance the votes for transnational lists could be evaluated using double-
proportionality, see Section 1.3 in Oelbermann, K.-F.: Biproportionale Divisormethoden und der 
Algorithmus der alternierenden Skalierung, Berlin, 2013. 
